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CHAPTER 3 
Criminal Law and Procedure 
DAVID ROSSMAN* 
§3.1. Effective assistance of counsel. Massachusetts has been in 
the forefront of the nation in providing indigent defendants the right 
to the appointment of counsel in criminal cases. The Supreme Judicial 
Court adopted its Rule 3:10, guaranteeing counsel to all indigent de-
fendants charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment in 1967, 
well before the United States Supreme Court ruled in Argersinger v. 
Hamlin 1 that, absent a valid waiver, no defendant may be imprisoned 
unless represented by an attorney. 2 The procedural aspects of the 
right to an attorney, involving the question of at what stages of the 
proceedings an appointment must be made, present far easier issues 
than does the question of defining the substantive content of the right 
to counsel. The mere presence of an attorney is not sufficient to 
satisfy the essence of the right to counsel as it is guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution3 and Article XII 
of the Declaration of Rights for the Commonwealth.4 For example, in 
Avery v. Alabama5 the Supreme Court stated: 
[T]he denial of opportunity for appointed counsel to confer, to 
consult with the accused and to prepare his defense, could con-
vert the appointment of counsel into a sham and nothing more 
than a formal compliance with the Constitution's requirement that 
an accused be given the assistance of counsel. The Constitution's 
guarantee of assistance of counsel cannot be satisfied by mere 
formal appointment. 6 
Although Massachusetts has had an expansive view of the pro-
cedural right to the appointment of counsel, several decisions handed 
*DAVID RosSMAN is Staff Attorney for the Boston University Center for Criminal Jus-
tice. 
§3.1. 1 407 u.s. 25 (1972). 
2 Id. at 37. 
3 U.S. Const. amend. VI. See Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940). 
4 See Commonwealth v. Bernier, 359 Mass. 13,267 N.E.2d 636 (1971). 
5 308 u.s. 444 (1940). 
6 ld. at 446. 
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down during the Survey year reveal a restrictive at~itude toward de-
fining the substantive right to assistance of counsel. ! 
A. COMMONWEALTH v. SAFER/AN 7 
In Commonwealth v. Saferian, the Supreme Judicial Court attempted 
to set out a standard by which claims for a new trial based on ineffec-
tive counsel will be evaluated. John Saferian was co victed by a jury 
of armed robbery and several other offenses. He w s represented at 
trial by private counsel, appointed at the arraignme t by the superior 
court to serve without compensation.8 At arraign ent, counsel ad-
vised the defendant to plead not guilty and to waiv commitment for 
observation of his mental condition. Counsel did no consult thereaf-
ter with the defendant during the next six weeks pr ceding the trial; 
counsel "said it was likely he had spoken in the intfrim to the pros-
ecutor, but he had no definite recollection of it."9 the only pretrial 
activity of counsel apparent from the record was his participation in a 
two-day hearing on a motion to suppress filed in c njunction with a 
co-defendant. Counsel's performance during the he ring on the mo-
tion to suppress and during the trial "was by no m ans lackadaisical 
or perfunctory."10 Indeed, the Court noted that: " ne can speculate 
that with superior effort or advocacy on the part o the defendant's 
counsel the case against the defendant might have een made to ap-
pear less formidable, but that would be empty conje ture; the truth is 
that the case by any lights was very strong."11 i 
Against this background, the Court proceede~ to assess the 
defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. On the one 
hand, "[c]ounsel did not go over the facts with the d fendant, or seek 
to interview the prospective witnesses, or ask the p secutor for ma-
terial, or make routine pre-trial motions apart fro the motion to 
suppress. He relied on cross-examination and argument."12 On the 
other hand, "[t]he case ... was relatively simple nd the evidence 
straightforward."13 The Court first reviewed the var ous formulae by 
which a standard for judging effective assistance of j:ounsel has been 
cast: (1) whether the inadequacy of counsel resul~ed in the trial's 
7 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1267, 315 N.E.2d 878. , 
8 The superior coun is now authorized to compensate privatejcounsel who receive 
court appointments. Superior Court Rule 95A. Sup. Jud. Ct. R. 3 10 provides that ap-
pointments shall go to attorneys from the Massachusetts Defender~ Committee or other 
volunteer organization, unless exceptional circumstances exist. : 
9 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1271, 3t5 N.E.2d at 881. 
10 Id. at 1271, 315 N.E.2d at 881 n.5. 
11 Id. at 1270-71, 315 N.E.2d at 881. 
12 Id. at 1275, 315 N.E.2d at 883. 
13 Id. at 1276, 315 N.E.2d at 883. 
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being "a farce and a mockery"14 or "an apparency instead of the real-
ity of contest and trial;"15 (2) whether "the attorney has in effect blot-
ted out the substance of a defense;" 16 or (3) whether counsel has been 
"reasonably likely to render and [is] rendering reasonably effective 
assistance."17 
Rather than endorsing one of these existing formulations, the Court 
chose to make explicit that a two-step analysis is required in adjudicat-
ing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The first step focuses 
on what counsel actually did at trial. It entails "a discerning examina-
tion and appraisal of the specific circumstances of the given case to 
see whether there has been serious incompetency, inefficiency, or in-
attention of counsel-behavior of counsel falling measurably below 
that which might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer .... "18 
If such inadequacy is found, then the second step requires a determi-
nation of whether counsel's action has "likely deprived the defendant 
of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defence."19 The bur-
den of demonstrating both the initial inadequacy and the resulting 
prejudice is on the defendant. 
The Court applied its two-pronged test in Saferian and found no 
constitutional error. With respect to the first step, the Court agreed 
with the defendant that counsel should have done more preparatory 
work for the trial, but felt that this deficiency was substantially re-
paired by counsel's r.articipation in the two-day proceedings on the 
motion to suppress. 0 With respect to the second step, the Court 
seized upon the fact that the defendant could point to no specific 
issue of fact or law that could have been used for his benefit at trial 
but which was overlookedY 
By forcing defendants to fit the mold of the two stage process set 
out in Saferian, the Court is assuring two consequences: (1) it will be 
exceedingly difficult for a successful claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel to be raised; and (2) no guidance is provided for the future 
benefit of trial judges, defense counsel, or defendants as to what ef-
fective assistance of counsel actually requires. The first result is 
primarily a function of the Court's requirement that the defendant 
must sustain the burden of proving that the trial counsel's neglect re-
14 Id. at 1274, 315 N.E.2d at 882, citing Commonwealth v. Lussier, 1971 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 731, 732, 269 N.E.2d 647, 649. 
15 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1274, 315 N.E.2d at 882, citing Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 
1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1091, 1104,299 N.E.2d 719,726. 
16 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1274, 315 N.E.2d at 883, citing Matthews v. United States, 
449 F.2d 985, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
17 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1274, 315 N.E.2d at 883, citing MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 
592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960). 
18 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1274, 315 N.E.2d at 883. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 1275, 315 N.E.2d at 883. 
21 Id. at 1276, 315 N.E.2d at 884. 
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suited in actual prejudice. The second result is a function of the 
Court's conclusory, shorthand description of the demands placed on 
trial counsel. 22 
Saferian represents the Court's reluctance to commit itself to firm 
guidelines by which to judge a trial counsel's conduct against the con-
stitutional guarantee of the Sixth Amendment and !Article XII of the 
Declaration of Rights for the Commonwealth. Drspite the Court's 
statement that a surface impression of guilt does npt end the inquiry 
as to whether there was adequate assistance of tounsel,23 implicit 
throughout the decision is the underlying assumpt on that a compel-
ling case for the defendant's guilt ameliorates th shortcomings of 
defendant's court appointed attorney. 24 
This assumption is demonstrated in both stages of the Court's 
analysis. In determining whether counsel's actions fell measurably 
below those expected of an ordinary lawyer (the first stage), the Court 
seems to excuse counsel's glaring deficiencies on the basis that guilt 
was so obvious that there was little real preparation to do. 25 The ex-
planation that counsel's participation in a two-day ~earing on the mo-
tion to suppress acted as adequate preparation f1r the trial itself26 
seems insufficient. This is due to the Court's failure1 to meet the objec-
tion that counsel was not adequately prepared for ~he hearing on the 
motion itself. A motion to suppress in a case where the police have 
seized a gun from the defendant, as in Saferian, often presents the 
22 The shortcomings of the rule in Saferian are more readily apparent when a com-
parison is made with other standards used to evaluate claims of ineffective counsel. See, 
e.g., United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Coles v. Peyton, 389 
F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1968). In DeCoster, Chief Judge Bazelon announced a two stage 
analysis. The first stage set forth explicit guidelines, incorporatirg ABA Standards Re-
lating to the Defense Function (1971) for the conduct of defen1se counsel. 487 F.2d at 
1203. Once a substantial violation of any of these requiremen~s has been shown, the 
second stage requires a determination of whether any prejudice !thereby resulted. Id. at 
1204. At this stage, the burden is placed on the prosecution. Id. I 
23 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1277, 315 N.E.2d at 884. i 
24 Cf., Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 Cin. L. Rev. 1 (1973): 
The final reason why judges are reluctant to reverse convictions on grounds of in-
adequate assistance is particularly disturbing to me. It is the belief- rarely articu-
lated, but, I am afraid, widely held-that most criminal defendants are guilty any-
way. From this assumption it is a short path to the conclusion that the quality of 
representation is of small account. This may be an important reason why appellate 
courts commonly require appellants to show not only that their constitutional right 
to effective counsel was denied but also that the denial was prejudicial. 
This "guilty anyway" syndrome underlies much of the cuntent push for greater 
"efficiency" in the criminal courts. On all sides these days wd hear the clamor for 
·~udicial reform," which too often looks like a euphemism ~· r dealing with more 
defendants in less time. Why allow men who are "guilty a yway" to clutter the 
courts with all sorts of difficult legal and constitutional questi ns? 
hlu~ · 
25 See 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1276, 315 N.E.2d at 883. 
26 Id. at 1271, 1275, 315 N.E.2d at 881, 883. 
4
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1974 [1974], Art. 7
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1974/iss1/7
§3.1 CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 39 
only triable issue in the case. It is certainly a "critical stage" of the 
proceedings at which counsel is required.27 Failure to prepare for a 
motion hearing is just as fatal as failure to prepare for a trial. 
An assumption of guilt also underlies placing the burden of proof 
of prejudice on the defendant. Certain failures on the part of defense 
counsel may never be amenable to discovery by a defendant. Who can 
tell, for example, in what ways a lack of preparation for an argument 
on disposition can affect the sentence? If it is indeed true that claims 
of prejudice involve only degrees of speculation, it seems contradic-
tory to require the defendant to substantiate the speculation. One 
reason given for putting the burden on the defendant is that he has 
already been tried and found guilty, and therefore the presumption 
of regularity of the verdict requires the party seeking to rebut the 
presumption to sustain his contention. The point of the claim of inef-
fective assistance of counsel is that the process by which the guilty 
verdict was arrived at is itself suspect since it was procured at a trial 
where the defendant was deprived of an essential right. 
The other reason given for placing the burden on the defendant is 
that the evidence supporting proof of prejudice is more readily avail-
able to the defendant than to the prosecutor. This assumption about 
which party has easier access to relevant information may be true 
when it is applied to the first stage of the analysis. Certainly defen-
dants are in a better position than prosecutors to tell the court in what 
way their defense attorneys shirked their duty. Such complaints as 
failure to confer with defendants or to interview witnesses that the de-
fendant relies upon for an alibi are easily within the knowledge of the 
defendant. It is quite another matter to talk about what result fol-
lowed from counsel's failures. Defendants who are in the position of 
having to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are almost 
always in jail, hardly the place from which to conduct an investigation 
designed to demonstrate prejudice. Since often these claims come up 
only by way of a collateral attack on the conviction-for if trial coun-
sel continues to represent the defendant on appeal, he is not likely to 
make an issue of his own incompetence-a long period of time has 
passed, hampering any investigation that a newly appointed attorney 
could conduct. It is no easier for the defendant to prove prejudice 
than it is for the prosecution to prove the absence of prejudice. Plac-
ing the burden of proving a lack of prejudice on the prosecution has 
precedent in cases involving illegally suggestive identifications, where 
once it is established that, absent a valid waiver, a lawyer was not 
present at the line-up, the prosecution must establish that the identifi-
cation was not tainted by the illegality.28 
27 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970). 
28 See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 
(1967). 
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The importance of the right to effective assista~ce of counsel ex-
tends beyond the concern of ensuring that innocept defendants are 
acquitted. The system of criminal justice has a stake in providing fair 
trials especially to those defendants who are found to be, and are in 
fact, guilty. An essential component of a fair trial is an effective 
defense. 29 If such a defense has been denied to a ~efendant, even a 
guilty defendant, the system suffers to that extend Saferian, by side-
stepping the issue of what constitutes effective performance of a crim-
inal defense and by placing the burden on the defendant to demon-
strate prejudice, may indicate that the Supreme Judicial Court does 
not wish to come to grips with the problem. 
B. CoMMONWEALTH v. DoMINico30 
In Commonwealth v. Dominica the Appeals Court was faced with de-
fendant Merlino's claim that he had been denied the effective assis-
tance of counsel. An attorney from the Massachusetts Defenders 
Committee was appointed to represent him one nionth prior to the 
start of his trial for participation in the Brinks armored car robbery. 
The attorney-faced with a heavy caseload and frustrated by prison 
officials in attempts to interview the defendant and by the district 
attorney's office in efforts to see necessary papers~filed a motion for 
a continuance, alleging that his lack of preparation }vould result in in-
effective assistance of counsel. The motion was denifd by the superior 
court, and the defendant was convicted. Despite counsel's affidavit 
that the denial of a continuance would result in his inability to prop-
erly investigate the facts, the Appeals Court merely !,held that the trial 
was not "a farce and mockery" and therefore the pixth Amendment 
had not been violated. 31 ! 
The circumstances which led to the claim of inefftctive assistance of 
counsel in this case present a difficult choice for a trial attorney. It 
has been suggested in one practice manuaP2 that in cases where abso-
lutely no time has been afforded for preparation, the attorney should 
not participate in the trial at all: "The danger of 1 participating in a 
t:ial when you are unrrepare? is that you _g~ve somr semblance of as-
SIStance of counsel Without m fact providmg coqtpetent represen-
tation." 33 Of course, in a felony trial in superior court where the 
appointment was made one month in advance, it would be much 
harder to justify not participating. 
The Appeals Court's opinion recognized the imjreasingly burden-
29 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
30 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 49, 306 N.E.2d 835. 
3
' Id. at 60, 306 N.E.2d at 846. 
32 Dick & Rosenberg, Manual for New Attorneys: New York Fafnily Court (1971). 
33 ld. at 25. : 
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some caseload of public defenders,34 but offered no further comment 
on the problem it raises. Since there is such a difficult barrier to rais-
ing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal, appointed 
counsel-including public defenders-who face the possibility that 
their overloaded schedule may not permit adequate time to prepare, 
should decline at the outset to accept an appointment. 
C. CoMMONWEALTH v. GERAWAY35 
The Survey year produced one case in which the Supreme Judicial 
Court took an expansive view of one aspect of the question of effec-
tive assistance of counsel. In Commonwealth v. Geraway, the Court dealt 
with the question of a potential conflict of interest on the part of 
counsel for the defendant. Geraway was tried and convicted of mur-
der in the first degree. His conviction was affirmed on appeal, 36 and 
he subsequently raised the issue of effective assistance of counsel in a 
motion for a new trial. 
The web of circumstances which led to defendant's claim centered 
around the relationship between the appointed defense attorney's law 
firm and various prosecution witnesses. Unbeknown to the defend-
ant's counsel, other members of his law firm had represented, and 
were representing, prosecution witnesses and their families in various 
civil and criminal matters. Some of them, in fact, were advised by 
members of the firm to cooperate with the police department in the 
investigation of the murder with which the defendant was charged. 
The defendant repeatedly questioned the firm's interest in represent-
ing him and whether it could give him its undivided loyalty since it 
represented a specific prosecution witness as well. The defendant was 
mistakenly told that the firm did not represent the witness in 
question. 37 
The Court accepted the findings of the trial judge that defendant's 
counsel had no knowledge of the conflict of interest and that counsel 
conducted himself free from any influence instigated by the conflict. 38 
In fact, the trial judge had found that the defense was conducted in a 
competent and skillful manner. 39 Aside from accepting these findings, 
the Court went on to find "slight, if any, possibility of prejudice."40 
On the basis of the Court's willingness in Saferian to reject claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel unless they were documented both by 
34 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 59, 306 N.E.2d at 845. 
35 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1281,301 N.E.2d 814. 
36 Commonwealth v. Geraway, 355 Mass. 433 (1969). 
37 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1283-86, 301 N.E.2d at 815-17. 
38 Id. at 1287, 301 N.E.2d at 817. 
39 Id. at 1281 n.1, 301 N.E.2d at 815 n.l. 
40 Id. at 1287, 301 N.E.2d at 817. 
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a showing of a specific instance of counsel's negligent conduct and a 
demonstration of prejudice, one would hardly think that Geraway 
would require much discussion. The Court, howev~r, chose to reverse 
the conviction,41 based upon the fact that "the si~uation was replete 
with potential constraints, both ethical and economic, on the firm's 
representation of the defendant."42 The m~ority opinion did not de-
cide whether the Constitution would require a new trial, but rather 
based the reversal on the Court's power under section 33E of General 
Laws, chapter 278,43 to determine if a miscarri~ge of justice has 
O(:curred. 44 I 
The sensitivity shown in the opinion to the requirement of undi-
vided loyalty placed upon defense counsel by the Sixth Amendment45 
is admirable. The precedential value is apt to be negligible, however, 
due to the basis for the Court's result. The case w~s decided on a 3-2 
vote, with Chief Justice Tauro and Justice Btaucher vigorously 
dissenting. 46 The dissent was based on a recent Massachusetts case, 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 41 which held that "[a] conflict of interest such 
as to deny to a defendant the effective assistance of counsel must be 
shown by evidence"48 and not by speculation. Rafher than stressing 
the potential for conflict that existed in the sit ation, the dissent 
would focus the investigation on whether the mul iple representation 
actually affected defense counsel's actions in some ay. The dissenters 
found that it did not, noting that the defendant was in no way prej-
udiced by his attorney's conduct of the case. 49 
The differences in approach between the two ppinions are clear. 
What is not clear is whether the majority opinion 'fill operate as a de-
finitive precedent in the future. The Smith case, rel~ed upon so heavily 
by the dissent, indicated in dicta that there are strong indications in 
the federal decisions that "a harmless error rule has no place in a case 
where a conflict of interest appears in the record."50 However, the 
41 Id. at 1289, 301 N.E.2d at 819. 
42 Id. at 1286, 301 N.E.2d at 817. 
43 G.L. c. 278, § 33E, which provides in part: 
In a capital case as hereinafter defined the entry in the sfpreme judicial court 
shall transfer to that court the whole case for its considerati n of the law and the 
evidence. Upon such consideration the court may, if satisfie that the verdict was 
against the law or the weight of the evidence or because of 1newly discovered evi-
dence, or for any reason that justice may require (a) order a !new trial or (b) direct 
the entry of a lesser degree of guilt, and remand the case to the superior court for 
the imposition of sentence .... 
44 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1289, 301 N.E.2d at 819. 
45 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 57, 70 (1942). 
46 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1289, 301 N.E.2d at 819 (dissentin opinion). Justices Kap-
lan and Hennessey did not participate. 
47 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 61, 291 N.E.2d 607. 
48 Id. at 63, 291 N.E.2d at 609. 
49 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1297, 301 N.E.2d at 823. 
50 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 63, 291 N.E.2d at609. 
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majority in Geraway did not deal with this suggestion raised by the 
Smith decision. The effect of the opinion, insofar as it elucidates the 
law of conflict of interest, is thus limited. With the dissent arguing 
that no conflict existed in the first place and the majority stressing the 
peculiar web of circumstances found in this particular case, the Court 
may well limit Geraway to its own facts. The real impact of the deci-
sion in this area may be upon the operation of large criminal law 
firms, and in particular the Massachusetts Defenders Committee, 
which are often in the position of defending clients caught up in a 
web of interconnecting circumstances. Defense firms should view the 
Geraway opinion as a strong recommendation that they should be on 
guard for potential conflicts. 
Outside of the area of conflict of interests, the opinion has wider 
ramifications with respect to the willingness of the Court to exercise 
its power to award a new trial under section 33E "for any other 
reason that justice may require."51 The dissent protested that this 
power should rest primarily in the hands of the trial judge rather 
than an appellate court: since the trial judge is closer to the case, he 
can detect "an aroma of unfairness" more reliably than can appellate 
judges examining a "stale transcript."52 
Trial judges, however, may be more reluctant to reverse the results 
of a trial over which they presided than would be an appellate court. 
Since granting a motion for a new trial acts in an implicit way as a 
censure of the conduct of the original proceedings, trial judges are 
placed in an anomalous position by such requests. So long as the Su-
preme Judicial Court has the power to grant new trials based on their 
review of the record for the fairness or justice of the proceedings, it 
may be unwise to give undue deference to the opinion of a trial judge 
that no new trial is required. 
§3.2. Validity of waiver of right to counsel. Closely related to 
the question of defining effective assistance of counsel is the question 
of determining a valid waiver of the right to counsel. The right will 
become an empty one if defendants acting out of ignorance choose 
not to avail themselves of its benefits. While the right to counsel can 
be waived, constitutional standards require a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver; otherwise the lack of counsel deprives the defen-
dant of a fair trial.l In Commonwealth v. Deeran,2 the defendant 
claimed that records of a prior conviction could not constitutionally be 
introduced to impeach his credibility because at that time he was not 
represented by counsel and had not validly waived counsel. 3 The only 
5t G.L. c. 278, § 33E. 
52 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1297-98, 301 N.E.2d at 824. 
§3.2. 1 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,748 (1970). 
2 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1309, 302 N.E.2d 912. 
3 See Loper v. Beta, 405 U.S. 4 73 ( 1972) (impeachment by use of convictions invalid 
under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), constitutes a denial of due process). 
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notation about waiver in the records sought to be introduced was a 
statement that "defendant did not want counsel" si~ned by the district 
court judge before whom the defendant pleaded! guilty. 4 The Su-
preme Judicial Court held that although the state~ent in the record 
fell short of the requirements for waiver set out in its Rule 3:10,5 it 
sufficed to meet the constitutional standard for establishing a waiver. 6 
The Court went on to state that: 
We are confirmed in our holding by the defenda~t's testimony on 
voir dire that pleading guilty "was the only sensfble thing to do, 
and we were out of there in an hour." He furth~r stated that the 
police "recommendation, I think, was six months' probation, and 
he says if I don't go along with it, I'd get a lot more, and that was 
the only reason I waived counsel, and plus the fa<tt that I could be 
out of there in an hour." 7 ' 
The Court's treatment of the waiver issue is ~s restrictive as its 
treatment of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The opinion 
stands for the proposition that a mere statement in the record that 
the defendant did not want counsel is sufficient to ~atisfy the constitu-
tional requirement of a knowing and intelligent w*ver in the face of 
uncontroverted evidence that the defendant waiv~d counsel only to 
avoid a harsher sentence than the one held out to him by the prosecu-
tion. 
It is well settled that a valid waiver cannot be presumed from a si-
lent record8 and that a waiver induced by threats i& not valid. 9 In this 
case, the record is silent beyond the fact that the pefendant did not 
want counsel. This state of affairs could be entirel~ consistent with a 
situation where the defendant refuses counsel because of improper 
threats (involuntary), where he does not understand the seriousness of 
the charge (not intelligent), or where he does not ~realize that he does 
not have to retain his own lawyer since he is indi ent (not knowing). 
In none of these three examples would a waiver meet the constitu-
tional standard. The defendant's statement on voir! dire revealed two 
reasons for "waiving" his right to counsel: (1) his desire to get the 
matter over with; and (2) the threat of loss of a police recommenda-
4 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1313,302 N.E.2d at 915. 
5 Sup. Jud. Ct. R. 3:10 provides in part: 
If the defendant elects to proceed without counsel, a waiver and a certificate of 
the judge on a form herein established shall be signed, respectively, by the defen-
dant and the judge and filed with the papers in the case. If the defendant elects to 
proceed without counsel and refuses to sign the waiver, thef!"udge shall so certify 
on a form herein established, which shall be filed with the pa ers in the case. 
6 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1314,302 N.E.2d at 915. 
7 Id. ' 
8 See Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962). 
9 See Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962). 
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tion of six months' probation. 10 The only evidence as to the character 
of the defendant's waiver indicates that the circumstances prevented a 
truly voluntary waiver. The Commonwealth should not condition its 
recommendation for a lenient sentence on a defendant's waiver of 
counsel. Although the United States Supreme Court has held that a 
defendant's guilty plea was not rendered involuntary due to the fact 
that it was induced by the defendant's desire to receive a more lenient 
sentence than he might have received if he went to trial, the Court 
emphasized that the possible coercion involved was dissipated by the 
presence and advice of counsel. 11 The right to counsel is far more 
important in ensuring a fair trial for a defendant than any of the 
rights which are waived by a guilty plea. Without counsel, a defendant 
cannot properly evaluate the merits of the Commonwealth's case or 
the benefits of the plea bargain that is offered. Moreover, a desire to 
get the matter over with quickly-though in itself a questionable 
reason to allow waiver of such a fundamental right-is entirely sus-
pect because it was formed without the benefit of an attorney who 
could inform the defendant of the advantages, if any, of seeking a 
continuance. These considerations led the American Bar Association 
to recommend that no waiver of counsel be accepted unless the de-
fendant first spoke with an attorney about the waiver. 12 On the other 
hand, the Deeran decision condones the practice of pressuring defen-
dants into abandoning rights intended for their protection in order to 
allow the system to operate more efficiently. 
The two pressures which resulted in the defendant's waiver in this 
case are symptomatic of a method of administering criminal justice 
which has been likened to an "assembly-line."13 The United States 
Supreme Court has recognized that the pressure of a high volume of 
cases often results in shoddy attention to procedural safeguards. 14 
When a defendant is faced with the dilemma either of asserting a 
constitutional right which will only add to the caseloads of his counsel 
and the court and delay the disposition of his case or of waiving that 
right upon the urging of those who are in a position to do him a 
great deal of harm, the course of waiver is all too easy. 
Since district court proceedings are only rarely recorded, far less at-
tention is paid to the niceties of ensuring for the record that a waiver 
is valid than is the case in superior court. Since the absence of a rec-
ord makes reconstruction of the events surrounding a waiver most 
difficult, the very minimum required of district court judges should 
be a written statement that the defendant was informed of the right 
10 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1314,302 N.E.2d at 915. 
11 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,756-58 (1970). 
12 ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function,§ 7.3 (1971). 
13 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36 (1972). 
14 Id. at 34-36. 
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to an appointed attorney and that this right was ~aived with a full 
understanding of the seriousness of the consequenqes of such a deci-
sion. Even the statement required by Rule 3:1015 fa~s short of provid-
ing assurance to an appellate court that the defen~ant was not pres-
sured into waiving his right to counsel; but short ofl recording a collo-
quy between the defendant and judge akin to 
1 
that required in 
superior court before allowing a guilty plea, it is thf best that can be 
done. Where the statement on waiver is as sparse1 as in Deeran and 
where circumstances exist to indicate that invalid reasons motivated 
the waiver, the burden should be on the Commo9wealth to demon-
strate that the constitutional standard was met. 1 
§3.3. District court procedure: Bindover hearirigs. In two cases 
decided in the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial d:ourt clarified the 
procedure to be followed in hearings at which a 1efendant may be 
bound over for action by the superior court. In Corey v. 
Commonwealth, 1 the Court met the question in the cobtext of a hearing 
involving an offense, the ultimate disposition of wpich is within the 
jurisdiction of both the district court and the suJierior court. In A 
juvenile, Petitioner, 2 the Court dealt with the que~tion of a district 
court's declining juvenile jurisdiction and institutipg adult criminal 
proceedings. I 
Corey followed closely in the footsteps of Myers lv. Commonwealth,3 
which was decided on July 17, 1973. Myers dealt witl~ the procedure to 
be followed by district courts in conducting proba*le cause hearings 
for offenses not within their final jurisdiction. 4 Mjers set forth both 
the standard to be used in determining probable c~use and the pro-
cedure to be followed in reaching that determinat~on. Since the pri-
mary purpose of a probable cause hearing is to scree~· out of the crimi-
nal process those cases that should not go to trial, he Supreme Judi-
cial Court adopted a "directed verdict" rule in defining the standard 
of probable cause.5 This rule requires (1) that there lbe sufficient cred-
15 Sup. Jud. Ct. R. 3:10. See note 5 supra. 
§3.3. 1 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1237,301 N.E.2d 450. 
2 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 61, 306 N.E.2d 822. 
3 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1045, 298 N.E.2d 819. 1 
4 G.L. c. 218, § 26 enumerates those offenses over which the 4istrict court may exer-
cise final jurisdiction. For those specified offenses, the district! court has concurrent 
jurisdiction with the superior court, and it can, if it does so in actordance with the pro-
cedures set out in Corey, see note 17 infra, make a final deter1·nation of guilt. A de-
fendant convicted of a crime in district court may appeal the fin ing of guilty and shall 
thereafter be entitled to a trial de novo in superior court. G.L. . 278, § 18. For those 
offenses not within the district court's jurisdiction, G.L. c. 2181, § 30 requires that a 
bindover or a probable cause hearing be held in order to determine if the defendant is 
probably guilty. If a person is found probably guilty in district cburt, he is bound over 
for trial in superior court. G.L. c. 218, § 30. I 
5 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1052, 298 N.E.2d at 824. 
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ible, admissible evidence that a crime has been committed and (2) that 
the defendant's guilt be demonstrated to the same degree necessary 
for submission to a jury over the objection of the defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict.6 This standard is significantly more demanding 
than is the standard of probable cause needed to justify an arrest; the 
arrest standard would be a meaningless screening tool since it may 
rest upon hearsay or other evidence not admissible at a trial. 7 
In order to effectuate this standard, Myers indicated that the proce-
dure to be followed at a probable cause hearing requires that the de-
fendant be given an opportunity to fully cross-examine the 
Commonwealth's witnesses and to present evidence in his own behalf. 8 
This means that affirmative defenses, such as lack of mental responsi-
bility, may be litigated at a probable cause hearing. The Court rested 
its conclusions in Myers on its interpretation of the statute governing 
probable cause hearings9 and on the constitutional implications that 
would be raised by a contrary holding. 10 
The Corey case followed Myers by two months. Corey was charged 
with possession of marijuana and unlawfully carrying a firearm, both 
of which are within the final jurisdiction of the district court (so called 
"dual jurisdiction" offenses).U At Corey's arraignment, the district 
court judge listened to a statement by the police officer of the facts 
leading to the arrest, examined the probation report, and then set a 
date for trial. Corey was then examined by the court clinic to deter-
mine if he was drug dependent. After the judge read the clinic's re-
port, the judge declined jurisdiction and bound the defendant over 
for action by the superior court. The defendant was never given an 
opportunity to cross-examine the police officer or to present any evi-
dence of his own. 12 
The Court entertained, by way of a supervisory writ, 13 the merits of 
Corey's complaint concerning the procedure followed in the district 
court. The Court held that the same statute upon which it rested its 
decision in Myers 14 requires that a defendant charged with a dual 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 1057-58, 298 N.E.2d at 828. 
9 Id., interpreting G.L. c. 276, § 38. 
10 Id. at 1056-57, 298 N.E.2d at 827. citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); 
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Gruttis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914). 
11 See note 4 supra. 
12 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1238-39, 301 N.E.2d at 452. 
13 A supervisory writ can be brought under G.L. c. 211, § 3 which provides in part: 
The supreme judicial court shall have general superintendence of all courts of 
inferior jurisdiction to correct and prevent errors and abuses therein if no other 
remedy is expressly provided; and it mav issue all writs and processes to such 
courts . . . which may be necessary to the furtherance of justice and to the regular 
execution of the law. 
14 G.L. c. 276, § 38. 
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jurisdiction offense be given the same rights at a ptobable cause hear-
ing as a defendant charged with a crime solely witpin the jurisdiction 
of the superior court. 15 The screening function performed by a pre-
liminary hearing is just as necessary for one type of offense as for the 
other. Moreover, the constitutional requirements of due process, men-
tioned in dicta in Myers, would be equally applicable to a defendant 
bound over to the grandjury. 16 i 
Even more significant for the administration of cbminal justice than 
the holding that all defendants in district court bindover hearings are 
entitled to a full hearing on the question of probable cause is the re-
quirement of Corey that the district court judge must announce prior 
to the start of the proceedings whether he is con~ucting a probable 
cause hearing or a full trial on the merits. 17 The p):ior practice in dis-
trict courts had been for a judge to reserve his decision on this ques-
tion until he had heard the Commonwealth's evidence. If the offense 
seemed serious enough, the judge would hold a probable cause hear-
ing; otherwise he would retain jurisdiction and render a verdict. The 
significance of Corey in this regard lies in the impli~ations for trial tac-
tics for both the prosecution and the defense. If the district court 
proceeding is a determination of probable cause, defense counsel will 
ordinarily seek to use the hearing solely as a vehicle for discovery, 
making no objections to inadmissible evidence and presenting no de-
fense witnesses. Likewise, the prosecution may wi~h to use different 
evidence and tailor its presentation to the Myers! "directed verdict" 
standard. Obviously, both defense and prosecution must conduct the 
case differently if it is a trial. 
Corey suggested that district court judges may conduct an initial ex-
amination of counsel for both the defense and the! Commonwealth to 
determine if a trial or a probable cause hearing shpuld be conducted. 
The decision suggested that one possible basis fo~ declining jurisdic-
tion would be the existence in superior court of pending cases which 
arose out of the same incident against the defendant or a 
co-defendant. 18 In general, as the Supreme Judicial Court has previ-
ously noted, district court judges should make their decision based 
upon: 
the circumstances of each particular case, ... the penalty which 
may be called for, and ... the necessity which may seem to be 
shown of an examination by the grand jury of any apparent 
ramifications that may need to be searched into jmore thoroughly 
than conveniently can be done in the lower court.!19 
15 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1242-43, 301 N.E.2d at 454. 
16 Id. at 1240-41, 301 N.E.2d at 453. 
17 Id. at 1242 n.7, 301 N.E.2d at 454 n.7. . 
18 ld. ! 
19 Commonwealth v. Rice, 216 Mass. 480,481, 104 N.E. 347, 3!49 (1914). 
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Since this initial determination may provide information to the judge 
which would be inadmissible at a trial on the merits, Corey requires the 
case to be tried before another judge if the defendant so moves. 20 
The Corey case, together with Myers, represents a significant reform 
in the administration of justice in the district courts. The conduct of 
probable cause hearings was often so arbitrary that defendants were 
summarily processed rather than accorded a fair hearing. The wil-
lingness of the Supreme Judicial Court to review the issues raised by 
both cases by means of a supervisory writ indicates a new sensitivity to 
the fairness of district court procedures. The impact of the decisions, 
along with other proposed changes such as recording district court 
proceedings, should go a long way in improving the image of justice 
in the district courts. 21 
The Supreme Judicial Court in A juvenile, Petitioner22 dealt with 
bindover hearings in the context of juvenile proceedings and disposed 
of a wide range of challenges to the procedure by which a juvenile 
court may decline jurisdiction over an offense and institute adult 
criminal proceedings. 
The petitioner in this case was arraigned as a juvenile and was 
charged with being a delinquent child on account of an attempted lar-
ceny of a motor vehicle. He was found indigent and counsel was ap-
pointed. A delinquency hearing was held, and the judge found suffi-
cient facts to warrant a finding of delinquency. After examining the 
petitioner's record, however, the judge determined that the petitioner 
was not a fit ~ubject for treatment as a juvenile and dismissed the 
complaint. 23 However, no written statement of the facts on which the 
judge relied in making his determination was made, as required by 
Rule 85 of the District Court Rules then in effect. 24 Immediately fol-
lowing the dismissal, an adult complaint was issued and a trial on the 
merits was held before the same judge, at which the petitioner admit-
ted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty. He received a sus-
pended sentence of three months in the house of correction and was 
placed on probation for one year. One month subsequent to the trial, 
the petitioner's probation was revoked and he was committed to serve 
his sentence. He brought a writ of habeas corpus to test the legality of 
the confinement, and the case was subsequently reported to the Su-
preme Judicial Court. 25 
The Court granted the relief sought by the petitioner on the basis 
20 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1242 n.7, 301 N.E.2d at 454 n.7. 
21 See generally S. Bing and S. Rosenfeld, The Quality of Justice in the Lower Crimi-
nal Courts of Metropolitan Boston (1970). 
22 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 61, 306 N.E.2d 822. 
23 Id. at 62-63, 306 N.E.2d at 824. 
24 Amended Rule 85 of the Rules of the District Courts became effective May 7, 
1973. 
25 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 62-63, 306 N.E.2d at 824-25. 
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I 
that the district court had no jurisdiction to try I him on an adult 
complaint. 26 The Court also d.ealt with three other~claims challenging 
the statutory scheme by which juvenile jurisdiction i waived. 27 
Section 61 of General Laws, chapter 11928 author zes a district court 
judge trying certain juveniles,29 after a hearing o~ the complaint, to 
dismiss the complaint "if the court is of the opinio~ that the interests 
of the public require that he should be tried [as a~ adult] ... instead 
of being dealt with as a delinquent child."30 If the (jourt makes such a 
determination, section 75 of General Laws, chap~er 11931 requires 
that a criminal complaint issue forthwith, that the c~mplainant and his 
witnesses be examined under oath and "if the pdson appears to be 
guilty of the offense or violation, the court shall cqmmit him or bind 
him over for trial in the superior court according ~o the usual course 
of criminal proceedings."32 : 
The Court ruled that section 75 provides only o~e function for the 
district court after it has dismissed a juvenile comlplaint pursuant to 
section 61 : to hold a probable cause hearing to ddtermine if the de-
fendant should be bound over to superior court. 3~ By its terms, sec-
tion 7 5 permits the district court to take action ith respect to the 
adult complaint only "if the person appears to be g ilty of the offense 
or violation."34 Such a standard is consonant with he function of the 
district court in determining probable cause, and ot in adjudicating 
the ultimate merits of a criminal charge.35 The st~tute's reference to 
the "usual course of criminal proceedings" taken in this context is a 
direction that the ensuing probable cause hearing should be held as 
are other probable cause hearings, and not that th district court may 
try those adult violations within its final jurisdictio~ under the proce-
dure set out in Corey v. Commonwealth. 36 ; 
In addition, the Court upheld the standard by' which the district 
court may decline juvenile jurisdiction.37 The only uidance provided 
26 Id. at 63-64, 306 N.E.2d at 825. I 
27 In addition to the issues mentioned in this discussion, the Court also held that in 
the case before it adequate notice of the fact that the district 4ourt might decide the 
issue of whether to waive jurisdiction or not had been provided to the petitioner. ld. at 
73, 306 N.E.2d at 830. 
28 G.L. c. 119, § 61. 
29 The procedure for waiving jurisdiction over a juvenile is p9ssible only with respect 
to juveniles between their 13th and 17th birthdays who are char~ed with adult offenses. 
G.L. c. 119, § 61. : 
30 ld. 
31 G.L. c. 119, § 75. 
32 Id. 
33 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 65, 306 N.E.2d at 826. 
34 G.L. c. 119, § 75. I 
35 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 65, 306 N.E.2d at 826. ! 
36 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1237, 301 N.E.2d 450. See text at note~ 1-21 supra. 
37 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 66-69, 306 N.E.2d at 826-28. 1 
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in the statute to district court judges is that juvenile jurisdiction 
should be declined when "the interests of the public" so dictate. 38 The 
petitioner argued that this standard was unconstitutionally vague and 
overbroad. The Court declined the opportunity to provide guidelines 
for the operation of juvenile justice. Rather than striking down the 
standard because it was so general, the Court made a virtue of its ap-
parent overbreadth by stating that "any reasonable argument" bearing 
on the course of treatment for the juvenile is relevant to the 
standard.39 Although the opinion acknowledged that factors relevant 
to the decision could be identified, the Court seemed to dismiss the 
utility of fleshing out the standard by concluding that a juvenile court 
would still be left with the task of balancing whatever factors were 
identified in light of the general public interest in any case. 40 
While refusing to find that a more specific juvenile waiver standard 
was constitutionally required, the Court made reference to Rule 85A 
of the District Court Rules, which identifies several factors that should 
be taken into account in considering whether to decline juvenile 
jurisdictionY Since the petitioner in this case was tried prior to the 
adoption of Rule 85A, the Court did not deal either with the question 
of what effect a failure to abide by the Rule would have or with the 
issue of the failure of the district court judge to specify in writing the 
reasons for his waiver decision. Although not directly before the 
Court, these two issues remain key factors in the protection of the 
rights of juveniles in waiver hearings. 
The Court has consistently avoided recognizing any constitutionally 
required procedural rights in the operation of a juvenile waiver 
38 G.L. c. 119, § 61. 
39 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 68, 306 N.E.2d at 827. 
40 Id. at 69, 306 N.E.2d at 828. 
41 Id. at 69 n.8, 306 N.E.2d at 828 n.8. Rule 85A of the Rules of the District Courts 
provides in part: 
On the question of whether to try the child as an adult because "the interests of 
the public require" the court shall consider factors such as: 
(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense; 
(2) the child's family, school and social history, including his court and 
juvenile delinquency record, if any; 
(3) the apparent emotional, social and psychological condition of the child; 
and 
(4) adequate protection of the public, the likelihood of rehabilitation of the 
child and the rehabilitation facilities available. 
If the court shall determine to dismiss the juvenile complaint and try the child as 
an adult, such determination shall be accompanied by a finding in writing of the 
facts demonstrating that the interests of the public require such determination, 
and the case shall be set down for a hearing on the adult criminal complaint as to 
probable cause to bind over the child to the next sitting of the Superior Court. 
The same justice or special justice hearing the juvenile complaint shall make the 
determination as aforesaid, but he shall not make a finding of probable cause un-
less the child shall have waived the probable cause hearing. 
17
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hearing.42 In spite of the fact that many other jurisdictions have rec-
ognized that In re Gault43 and McKeiver v. Pennsylvania 44 made clear 
the constitutional basis for requiring that procedfral rights, as set 
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Kent v.1 United States,45 be 
guaranteed to a juvenile in a waiver hearing,46 the I Supreme Judicial 
Court has not yet done so. Its decisions recognizing procedural rights 
in a waiver hearing, such as the right to adequate notice, have been 
based on the Court's control over the administration of justice rather 
than on constitutional grounds. 47 Left without a c~nstitutional basis, 
the question of asserting prQcedural rights at a wai~er hearing is still 
in limbo. Whether a juvenile can challenge a waiver decision because 
no statement of reasons was given or because the "public interest" 
would in fact not be served by a waiver is still unresolved. 
In rejecting any constitutional requirement fo~ a more specific 
waiver standard, the Court analogized the transfer ~ecision to a deci-
sion on sentencing. 48 Since sentencing judges njlay exercise their 
power without any statutory guidelines other than a maximum and a 
minimum sentence, the Court reasoned that juvenile judges may 
likewise exercise the power to waive jurisdiction with a similar absence 
of guidelines. 49 Perhaps a better analogy to the ju~enile waiver pro-
cess exists in the procedure whereby a district c4urt judge decides 
whether to hold a probable cause hearing or a trial ion the merits of a 
dual jurisdiction offense. The importance of this analogy can be bet-
ter understood if the implications of a lack of standards are first ex-
amined. 
Lack of standards in the exercise of power impli~s that a defendant 
faces the task of trying to present his case in the I best light without 
knowing what the decision-maker considers relevant. Lack of stan-
dards also implies that the decision reached will not be reviewed since 
the absence of a standard by which to judge the decision makes re-
view meaningless. The same holds true if the decisi~n is made without 
any statement setting forth its rationale 50 since hidling the process by 
I 
42 E.g., Commonwealth v. Roberts, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1477, 1487, 285 N.E.2d 919, 
926; Commonwealth v. Martin, 355 Mass. 296, 301, 244 N.E.2d 303, 306 (1969). But 
see Commonwealth v. Anderson, 13 Cr. L. Rep. 2061 (Suff. SuJM1r. Ct. 1973). 
43 387 u.s. I (1967). I 
44 403 u.s. 528 (1971). 
45 383 u.s. 541 (1966). 
46 E.g., In re Harris, 67 Cal. 2d 876, 434 P.2d 615, 64 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1967). Carver 
& White, Constitutional Safeguards for the Juvenile Offender, 14 Crime & Delinq. 63 
(1968). 
47 See Commonwealth v. A juvenile, 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 811,!296 N.E.2d 194. :: :~:4 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 68, 306 N.E.2d at 827. I 
50 "The only purpose of such a requirement [a statement of reasons for declining 
Federal Youth Act sentencing under 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005 et seq.] would be to facilitate 
appellate supervision of, and thus to limit, the trial court's sentencing discretion." Dors-
zynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424,441-42 (1974). 
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which the decision was reached makes impossible a judgment as to 
whether all the relevant factors were taken into account. 
If the Court had held that the Constitution required a more specific 
standard for juvenile waiver hearings, it would also have had to face, 
sooner or later, the issue of lack of standards in the context of an 
adult waiver hearing for a dual jurisdiction offense. As with the 
juvenile waiver statutes, the statute governing dual jurisdiction bind-
over hearings51 provides no guidelines by which a judge can decide 
whether to retain jurisdiction. 
Although the Court in A juvenile avoided placing the need for stan-
dards in a juvenile waiver hearing on a constitutional footing, it refer-
red several times to the requirements placed on district courts by Rule 
85A. 52 Rule 85A requires a written statement of reasons and provides 
a series of factors relevant to the decision. 53 It thus accomplishes by 
court rule what the petitioner sought to establish as a constitutional 
mandate. By setting standards and requiring reasons, Rule 85A seems 
to contemplate some review of the decision to waive juvenile jurisdic-
tion. If in subsequent decisions the Court holds that Rule 85A confers 
rights upon a juvenile which must be remedied if they are violated, 
then the Court's reluctance to rely on constitutional grounds would be 
moot. The same relief would be granted, but on different grounds. 
Perhaps the Court's reference to Rule 85A in A juvenile was meant to 
indicate that for future cases the existence of the district court rule 
will obviate the need for a constitutional ruling. The constitutional 
issue still lurks in the shadows, however, both in juvenile waiver hear-
ings and in dual jurisdiction bindovers. 54 
The remaining issue dealt with in A juvenile was whether trying a 
juvenile on an adult complaint after he had already been adjudicated 
delinquent in a juvenile hearing violated the constitutional ban on 
being placed twice in jeopardy. This particular application of double 
jeopardy arises only because Massachusetts procedure requires that 
the waiver decision be made after the hearing on the delinquency 
complaint has been held and the complaint dismissed. 55 
51 G.L. c. 276, §38. See text at notes 18-20 supra. 
52 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 66 nn.5-6, 69 n.8, 306 N.E.2d at 826 nn.5-6, 828 n.8. 
53 Id. at 69 n.8, 306 N.E.2d at 828 n.8. See note 41 supra. 
54 In terms of numbers, neither procedure represents a large share of the criminal 
business of the district courts. In 1968, for example, juvenile jurisdiction was waived for 
only 140 juveniles out of almost 20,000 cases pending in juvenile sessions. Statistical 
Reports of the Commissioner of Correction, Commonwealth of Massachusetts 116 
( 1969). Although there are no comparable statistics for the number of hearings held in 
dual jurisdiction offenses to determine whether to hold a probable cause hearing or a 
trial, that situation does not often arise. The district courts decline jurisdiction in 
perhaps no more than three per cent of appropriate cases. S. Bing and S. Rosenfeld, 
The Quality of Justice in the Lower Criminal Courts of Metropolitan Boston 78 (1970). 
55 See G.L. c. 119, §§ 61, 75. 
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The double jeopardy clause of the United Statesl Constitution56 is 
designed to protect defendants not only from being! subject to multi-
ple punishment for the same offense, but td deter multiple 
prosecutions.57 There are, however, exceptions t~ this rule. The 
primary one occurs when the defendant obtains a n~w trial upon mo-
tion or appeal. His subsequent prosecution for the fme offense does 
not constitute double jeopardy. 5 8 The rationale for his exception has 
been expressed both in terms of waiver and of conti uing jeopardy. 5 9 
This latter concept implies that the double jeopardy bar is aimed not 
at successive trials, but at successive prosecutions, an that prosecution 
for a crime does not end until the defendant has rnally received a 
fair trial affirmed on appeal. The United States Su~reme Court's re-
cent double jeopardy opinions have indicated, ho~ever, that more 
important than placing a definitive label on the ratio~ale for the bar is 
the operation of its mandate. 60 Instead of searching to find a waiver 
or a continuing jeopardy, the operation of the doub'e jeopardy clause 
requires that in each situation the defendant's interest in not being 
subjected to multiple prosecutions be weighed again~t society's interest 
in its ability to secure an adjudication of the q estion of guilt. 61 
Rather than undertaking this type of balancing pro ess, however, the 
Supreme Judicial Court in A juvenile chose to surrjmarily reject the 
double jeopardy claim by stating: ! 
The dismissal of the juvenile complaint and the i issuance of an 
adult complaint are contemplated by the statute (d.L. c. 119, § 75) 
to be in effect one event, and, as such, any jeoptrdy to which a 
juvenile was initially subjected under the juvenile 
1 
complaint con-
tinues under the adult complaint.62 i 
The opinion conceded that the Commonwealth i is bound by the 
federal double jeopardy clause and that jeopardy exltends to proceed-
ings in a juvenile court. 63 Thus, a second juvenile cotn plaint could not 
be sought based upon the same offense alleged iq a prior juvenile 
complaint which had already been adjudicated (unlrss the first com-
plaint had been reversed on appeal). Since there1 is no jury in a 
juvenile court, the usual benchmark for the commencement of 
56 "[N)or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be ~wice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb .... "U.S. Const. amend. V. · 
57 United States v.Jorn, 400 U.S. 470,479 (1971). 
58 See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896) (retrial after ~ppeal); United States 
v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824) (retrial after mistrial duet~ hung jury). 
59 See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 189 (1957). 1 
60 See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 463 (1973); United! States v. Tateo, 377 
u.s. 463, 466 (1964). ' 
81 Id. 
62 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 71, 306 N.E.2d at 829. 
83 Id. at 70-71, 306 N.E.2d at 829. 
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jeopardy-the empaneling of the jury-cannot be used. The Court 
accepted for the purposes of this case that jeopardy attaches to a 
juvenile when the juvenile proceedings commence64-presumably 
when the judge begins to hear the evidence on the delinquency com-
plaint. 
Given this initial analysis, the Court's treatment of the merits of the 
double jeopardy claim is disappointing. The conclusory statement that 
the jurisdictional waiver system is one of continuing jeopardy65 over-
looks the very real disadvantage to which the juvenile is placed be-
cause of the Massachusetts procedure. The juvenile is not only forced 
to undergo the burden of having to face two consecutive trials on the 
merits, but is also disadvantaged by having to reveal in the hearing on 
the juvenile complaint his defenses to the charge which will subse-
quently be tried in adult court. These are the very evils to which the 
double jeopardy clause was directed in the first place. These disadvan-
tages faced by the juvenile could easily be avoided by holding the 
waiver hearing before any hearing on the merits of the juvenile com-
plaint. This order of proceeding is in fact the procedure recom-
mended in the Uniform Juvenile Court Act66 and the Legislative 
Guide for Drafting Family and Juvenile Court Acts. 67 The only reason 
for the Massachusetts procedure offered by the opinion was that re-
quiring a waiver decision prior to the delinquency hearing would ex-
pose the judge to information which has no bearing on the question 
of delinquency if in fact no waiver is made. 68 
This reason hardly seems to merit pause. The same problem arises 
in the context of adult bindover hearings, and the Court in Corey 
solved it by requiring a judge other than the judge who made the de-
cision not to hold a bindover hearing to preside at the trial if the de-
fendant so requests. 69 The same expedient could avoid the problem in 
juvenile waiver hearings. If the prosecuting officials wish to proceed 
with the juvenile in superior court, they can, prior to the hearing on 
the complaint, move for a hearing on the issue of waiver of jurisdic-
tion. If the judge declines to waive jurisdiction, the defendant can 
move that the hearing on the complaint be before another judge. 
This double jeopardy problem is not a fanciful one. Although the 
Court's opinion states that no contrary authority exists with respect to 
its result, one of the cases relied upon by the Court, Jones v. Breed/0 
64 Id. at 71, 306 N.E.2d at 829. 
65 Id. 
66 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Juvenile 
Court Act § 34(a) ( 1968). 
6 7 Children's Bureau, U.S. Dept. of H.E.W., Legislative Guide for Drafting Family 
and Juvenile Court Acts § 31 (a) ( 1969). 
68 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 72 n.10, 306 N.E.2d at 829 n.10. 
69 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1242 n.7, 301 N.E.2d at 454 n.7. 
70 343 F. Supp. 690 (C.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd, 497 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 
95 S. Ct. 172 (1974), cited in 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 72, 306 N.E.2d at 829. 
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was reversed on appeal several months after A juvenile was decided. 71 
In Jones, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held I that a California 
procedure similar to the one used in Massachusetts did in fact violate 
the ban on double jeopardy. 72 
§3.4. Indigent defendants: Equal Protection. In cases decided 
during the Survey year, both the Supreme Judici~l Court and the 
United States Supreme Court adjudicated claims by! indigent criminal 
defendants that the state must provide them benefits equivalent to 
those which a defendant with the financial means could purchase for 
himself. In Blazo v. Superior Court, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court held 
that indigent defendants must be provided with stepographers to re-
cord their superior court trials and with subpoenas! to summons wit-
nesses for their defense, both at the Commonwea\th's expense. 2 In 
Ross v. Moffit, 3 the United States Supreme Court held that the state 
need not provide assistance of counsel to indigent defendants seeking 
a discretionary appeal. 4 
Blazo arose as a result of a challenge, based upon !an extraordinary 
writ, to the procedure followed by the superior cm.lut in conducting 
de novo trials on appeal from district court misdemeanor convictions. 
The Court's opinion is essentially based upon the constitutional doc-
trine of equal protection,5 as was the Ross decision. Blazo extended the 
doctrine while Ross limited it, although both cases! relied upon the 
same antecedents. These precedents are referred to ~s the "transcript 
cases," beginning in 1956 with Griffin v. Illinois 6 wijich recognized a 
right of indigent defendants to receive at state experise a transcript of 
their trial proceedings for use in appellate review. 7 The Supreme 
Court extended Griffin to include transcripts of preliminary hearings, 8 
transcripts of trials involving misdemeanors9 or tiolations of city 
ordinances, 10 and state procedures which restricted !transcripts either 
to the request of a public defender11 or by means l:>f a requirement 
71 Jones v. Breed, 497 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 172 (1974). 
72 ld. at 1168. ! 
§3.4. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1325, 315 N.E.2d 857. Blazo was de~ided together with a 
companion case, Lopez v. Commonwealth. ' 
2 Id. at 1329, 1335, 315 N.E.2d at 860, 863. 
3 417 u.s. 600 (1974). 
4 Id. at 619. 
5 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Although Blaw is essentially an fqual protection case, 
the opinion mentions that the precedents on which it relies rest on 1 due process grounds 
as well as equal protection. 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1327 n.3, 3151'!1.E.2d at 859 n.3. 
6 351 u.s. 12 (1956). 
7 Id. at 19. 
8 Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967). 
9 Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971). 
10 Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969). 
11 Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963). 
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for certification by the trial judge that the appeal was not frivolous. 12 
The Griffin proposition that the type of justice a person receives 
cannot depend upon his financial status was applied to areas other 
than transcripts. So long as the "basic tools of an adequate defense or 
appeal" are available to those defendants with the means to pay, then 
the state must, within reason, provide them to those who cannot 
pay. 13 The Supreme Court has used this reasoning to invalidate filing 
fees which were a prerequisite to an appeal from a criminal 
conviction14 and fees required to file a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus. 15 In Massachusetts, Griffin has been applied to require the de-
fendant to receive at state expense a blood test to defend in a pater-
nity case. 16 
This equality principle was also applied to the area of representa-
tion by counsel on appeal. Douglas v. California 17 held that a state must 
provide indigent criminal defendants with counsel for an appeal of 
right. 18 Douglas long represented, along with Griffin, the linchpin of 
equal protection in the area of criminal procedure. Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court has recently begun to chip away at the foundations of 
Douglas, thus narrowing the scope of the equality principle. Ross pre-
sented the question of whether Douglas would be extended to cover 
the appointment of counsel for a discretionary appeal taken after 
court-appointed counsel had represented the defendant at the first 
appeal of right. The Court held that neither due process nor equal 
protection required a state to provide an indigent defendant with 
counsel for such discretionary appeals. 19 
Although past Supreme Court opinions applying the equality prin-
ciple to extend benefits to indigent defendants uniformly contained 
the caveat that a state could still make distinctions based on ability to 
pay, so long as they were not unreasonable distinctions, 20 the only real 
check placed on the scope of the equality principle had been, prior to 
Ross, confined to cases holding that the benefit sought by the defen-
dant was either unnecessary or was substantially supplied through 
another means. Thus, in Britt v. North Carolina, 21 a transcript of a 
defendant's first trial was held not necessary at a retrial because all 
12 Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963). 
13 Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971). 
14 Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959). 
15 Smith v. Bennet, 365 U.S. 708 (1961). 
16 Commonwealth v. Possehl, 355 Mass. 575, 246 N.E.2d 667 (1969). 
17 372 u.s. 353 (1963). 
18 Id. at 357-58. 
19 417 U.S. at 610, 612. The Court in Ross noted that, as with all rights, equal 
protection-if left unchecked-would tend "to declare [itself] absolute to [its] logical ex-
treme." Id. at 611-12. 
20 See Rinaldi v. Yaeger, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966). 
21 404 u.s. 226 (1971). 
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' 
the original parties were present at the second proce~ding.22 The rule 
seemed to be that if the benefit sought was super~uous, then equal 
protection did not require the state to provide it. 
In Ross, the Court was presented with two situations in which the 
defendant sought the appointment of counsel to represent him in a 
discretionary review beyond his first appeal: a discre~ionary review by 
a state supreme court of an intermediate appeals court decision and a 
review by way of a writ of certiorari to the Unite4 States Supreme 
Court from a state supreme court. In these situations, denying the 
benefit of counsel to the defendant left him in a situation far from 
equivalent to having received the advantage which
1 
he sought. The 
benefit of counsel to help prepare a request for a di~cretionary review 
is far from superfluous. The requirements demandfd by the "some-
what arcane art of preparing petitions for discretionary review"23 are 
not likely to be satisfied by a brief intended for a direct appeal, since 
the criteria by which the reviewing court chooses to exercise its discre-
tion to hear the case is not always as narrow as the llegal issues raised 
by the trial. The Supreme Court in Ross seemed to ichange the focus 
of the test of equal protection in the area ofcriminat procedure from 
whether the benefit sought by the defendant was unnecessary or 
otherwise supplied to how important the benefit was to the defendant. 
Since a discretionary appeal arises only after a conviction and an ini-
tial affirmance, continued judicial review is not as! vital as the first 
appeal. 24 The fact that the transcript cases were extruded to circum-
stances beyond a first appeal-to include even collateral attack on a 
conviction25-indicates the extent of the Court's retreat. 
Blazo, unlike Ross, reached the result that the equal protection doc-
trine required the state to provide the benefit~ sought by the 
defendant.26 The difference in result is not so much a consequence of 
a more expansive view of the equality principle as it 
1
is due to the dif-
ference in circumstances. Blazo dealt with subpoenas and trial stenog-
raphers, both of which have wider application and are more funda-
mental to the protection of the rights of a defendant than is the assis-
tance of counsel in a discretionary appeal. i 
Subpoenas for defense witnesses are necessary noti only to ensure a 
fair trial, but to implement the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of 
"compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in [the accused's] 
favor."27 The Supreme Judicial Court in Blazo prescribed a procedure 
to be followed by an indigent defendant seeking prpcess for needed 
22 Id. at 228-30. 
23 417 U.S. at 616. 
24 See 417 U.S. at 610-11. 
25 E.g., Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966). 
26 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1328, 315 N.E.2d at 860-61. 
27 U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
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witnesses. First, an affidavit setting forth the defendant's indigency 
and a statement explaining why the witness is necessary to the defense 
must be presented. 28 The defendant may make this representation ex 
parte in order to avoid disclosing to the prosecution why a certain 
witness will be subpoenaed, but must still satisfy the trial judge, who 
may require further information. As to where the line is drawn, the 
opinion stated only that a defendant may not demand "excessive and 
therefore pointless expenditure."29 Thus, the Court, by giving trial 
judges this means by which to control requests they consider un-
reasonable, left open the possibility of an indigent defendant being 
deprived of the means to summons a necessary witness. The need to 
guard against frivolous requests which would be time-consuming and 
expensive could be achieved without requiring an affidavit if the court 
were to rely on the professional responsibility of defense counsel as 
was done in regard to stenographers.30 However, if the discretion of 
trial judges is exercised so that only superfluous requests for sub-
poenas are denied, the constitutional requirements will be satisfied. 
The Court held in the portion of the opinion dealing with a stenog-
raphic record that a request for a trial stenographer must be granted 
without any need for the defendant to show why a record is necessary 
or why a tape recording would not be an adequate substitute. 31 The 
Court was mindful of the expense involved, but considered that the 
speculative nature of a defendant's need for a stenographic record 
would make any attempt at justification too unwieldly. 32 Thus, the 
Court felt that defense counsel's professional responsibility would 
have to be sufficient to prevent abuses. 33 Moreover, since prior to 
Blazo stenographers were supplied in all superior court cases except 
for appeals from misdemeanor convictions, there will not be that 
many requests. Subpoenas, on the other hand, are necessary in almost 
every criminal case and the requirement of justification therefore 
serves as a safeguard against a much greater drain on the state's fi-
nancial resources. 
The transcript portion of Blazo also reveals how the Court is influ-
enced in its application of the equality principle by its view of how 
important the benefit is to the defendant. Blazo involved a request 
that the state provide to indigent defendants a service that the state 
does not provide for a price to non-indigent defendants, but one that 
they purchase themselves from outside sources. The distinction be-
28 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1329, 315 N.E.2d at 860. 
29 Id. The Court noted that new Rules of Criminal Procedure for Massachusetts are 
being formulated, and set out this procedure pending adoption of an appropriate new 
Rule. Id. 
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tween the source of the service appears at first ~lush to be incon-
clusive: so long as nonindigent defendants can avalil themselves of a 
significant defense tool and indigents cannot, the so~rce is immaterial. 
This distinction, however, was the ground for the ~ourt's decision in 
Commonwealth v. Britt34 that the state did not have t<i> provide indigent 
defendants with transcripts of their probable cause ~earings. 35 With a 
certain degree of illogic, the Britt case reasoned thatjthe state operated 
equally with respect to rich and poor defendants: ~either class could 
get a transcript of the probable cause hearing from !the state since the 
state was not in the business of providing them. 36 1 
Since the state is not in the business of providini stenographers at 
misdemeanor de novo trials either, the Britt case would indicate that 
there was no violation of equal protection in Blazo. ather than follow 
Britt, however, the Court in Blazo emphasized the 4ifference between 
a probable cause hearing and a trial: because a t~ial actually deter-
mines guilt or innocence and is subject to revie~ for errors, it is 
therefore more important than a probable cause hearing. 37 The dis-
tinction is an accurate one, but it does not bear on t~e question that is 
pertinent to the Court's own analysis-whether a t~ial transcript is in 
fact more important to a defendant than a probabl~ cause transcript. 
A trial transcript is important only if the case is appealed and even 
then only if the appeal is based on something that qccurred at trial. If 
those two conditions are met, which is not often! the case, then a 
transcript certainly is important. A probable cause ~ranscript is of use 
in every instance where the case is bound over to t~e superior court, 
especially in light of its value to the defendant as ai tool for discovery 
and for impeachment. The fact that a probable ca~se transcript is as 
important to the defendant as a trial transcript dQes not mean that 
Blazo should have followed Britt. It does indicate, ~owever, the diffi-
culty of trying to parcel out rights based on a co4rt's assessment of 
their importance to the defendant. : 
STUDENT CoMMENT 
I §3.5. Burden of proof of probable cause in a w~rrantless search: 
Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto. 1 On the afternoo~ of June 9, 1971, 
two officers of the Framingham police department !were informed by 
a radio broadcast from police headquarters that twp young men had 
34 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1443, 285 N.E.2d 780. Britt was the su!i>ject of a student com-
ment in 1972 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law§ 7.6, at 155. ; 
35 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1448, 285 N.E.2d at 784. ' 
36 Id. 
37 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1332, 315 N.E.2d at 862. 
§3.5. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1225, 315 N.E.2d 530. 
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attempted to pass a bad check at the Framingham Trust Company. 2 
The bulletin described the vehicle used by the men, including the reg-
istration number. Shortly thereafter, the officers stopped a vehicle 
matching that description and recognized the driver, defendant 
Richard Antobenedetto, and his companion as "known drug users and 
suspected bad check passers."3 After ordering the occupants from the 
vehicle, one of the officers proceeded to search the car without first 
obtaining a warrant. 4 The officer discovered in the glove compart-
ment a cellophane-wrapped package containing marihuana, a foil-
wrapped package of hashish, and a corncob pipe. 5 The two men were 
arrested, and Antobenedetto was charged with two counts of unlawful 
possession of narcotic drugs. 6 
Antobenedetto, tried without a jury in superior court, moved to 
suppress the evidence seized during the warrantless search of the au-
tomobile. The trial judge denied the motion, holding that the infor-
mation received in the radio bulletin together with the officers' recog-
nition of the car's occupants as bad check passers afforded probable 
cause to stop the car and arrest its occupants. 7 The defendant was 
found guilty on both counts and appealed. 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the lower court's denial of 
the motion to suppress and held that the prosecution failed to sustain 
its burden of establishing probable cause for the warrantless search of 
the automobile. Writing for the majority, Justice Reardon reasoned 
that the Commonwealth did not establish the reliability of the infor-
mation received by the arresting officers in the radio bulletin. 8 In 
reaching this conclusion, the majority relied upon the recent United 
States Supreme Court case Whiteley v. Warden, 9 which was interpreted 
as requiring that probable cause be supported by "evidence ... dem-
onstrating that the police officer responsible for issuing the radio 
communication had reliable information that a crime had occurred 
and that the instrumentalities or evidence of that crime would be 
found in the vehicle described in the broadcast."10 In Antobenedetto, no 
evidence was presented by the prosecution at the suppression hearing 
as to the reliability of the information which resulted in the radio 
communication.U The majority held, contrary to prior decisions, 12 




6 Id. at 1225, 315 N.E.2d at 531. Antobenedetto was charged under G.L. c. 94, § 205, 
repealed by Acts of 1971, c. 1071, § 2. 
7 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1226, 315 N.E.2d at 532. 
8 Id. at 1230, 315 N.E.2d at 534. 
9 401 U.S. 560 (1971). 
10 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1229-30, 315 N.E.2d at 534. 
11 Id. at 1230, 315 N.E.2d at 534. 
12 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pignone, 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 739, 741, 281 N.E.2d 
572, 573; Commonwealth v. Roy, 349 Mass. 224, 229, 207 N.E.2d 284, 287 (1965). 
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that the burden of proving probable cause for the warrantless search 
rested with the state, and felt compelled by Whiteley to grant the mo-
tion to suppress. 13 
This casenote will present a discussion of Antobenedetto in light of 
relevant United States Supreme Court decisions and pertinent policy 
considerations. It will be submitted that although ~he Supreme Judi-
cial Court erred in applying Whiteley to the facts irt Antobenedetto, the 
Court reached the correct result. 
The Fourth Amendment requires that all searchds and seizures not 
be "unreasonable."14 There is no precise form~.1la to determine 
reasonableness, however, and the Supreme Cou'rt has frequently 
stated that each case must be decided on its particular facts. 15 The ex-
istence of probable cause is essential for a search to be reasonable. 16 
Probable cause has been defined as "facts and circumstances within 
[the arresting officers') knowledge and of which they had reasonably 
trustworthy information ... sufficient in themselves, to warrant a man 
of reasonable caution in the belief" that a crime h;:ts been or is being 
committed. 17 ' 
The Supreme Court in Whiteley emphasized the: need for proving 
probable cause for an arrest or a search pursuant t<i> a warrant as well 
as for a warrantless arrest or search. 18 In Whiteley, ~sheriff acting on 
an informer's tip swore out a complaint against the defendant for 
breaking and entering before a justice of the peace, who then issued 
an arrest warrant. 19 A radio message was transmitted giving the 
names and descriptions of the suspected perpetrators, and descrip-
tions of the vehicle they were driving and the amount and type of 
money that was taken. 20 A patrolman, relying on the information con-
tained in the broadcast, stopped a vehicle and a~rested defendant 
Whiteley and his companion.21 A subsequent sea~ch uncovered the 
contraband described in the radio bulletin. 22 
13 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1229-30, 315 N.E.2d at 533-35. 
14 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to 
be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment applies to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See note 54 infra. 
15 E.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950); Go~Bart Importing Co. v. 
United States, 282 U.S. 344,357 (1931). I 
16 E.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,479 (1963). ' 
17 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). 
18 401 U.S. at 566. 
19 Id. at 562-63. 
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The Court upheld the defendant's challenge to the warrant because 
the record was devoid of any information which would support either 
the reliability of the informer or the informer's conclusion that the 
men were connected with the crime. 23 It then disagreed with the 
state's argument that regardless of the sufficiency of information to 
support an arrest warrant the arresting officer possessed adequate 
factual information to sustain a finding of probable cause for a war-
rantless arrest. 24 In support of this contention, the state argued that 
the standards applied by a reviewing court in evaluating a police 
officer's assessment of probable cause for an arrest or search without 
a warrant should be lower than those such a court would require to 
support a magistrate's finding of probable cause. 25 In rejecting this 
argument, the Court held that the standards of probable cause appli-
cable in a warrantless search must be at least as stringent as those used 
in deciding whether a warrant should be issued. 26 
Finally, the Court noted that the officer receiving the radio trans-
mission was entitled to assume that the officer who obtained the war-
rant provided an adequate factual basis to support a finding of prob-
able cause. 27 While holding that the officer was entitled to act on this 
assumption, the Court cautioned that the arrest or search would be 
subject to a successful challenge where the "contrary" turned out to be 
true, i.e., where there were insufficient facts to justify issuing the 
bulletin.28 
Chief Justice Tauro, dissenting in part in Antobenedetto,29 argued 
that the majority had mistakenly relied upon Whiteley in determining 
who should have the burden of establishing probable cause because 
the defendant in Whiteley had demonstrated the unreliability of the 
police bulletin. It logically followed, if Whiteley was applicable at all, 
that the defendant should have the burden of proving lack of proba-
ble cause for a warrantless search.3° Chief Justice Tauro supported 
23 Id. at 564-65. 
24 Id. at 565-66. 
25 Id. at 566. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 568. 
28 Id. 
29 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1233, 315 N.E.2d at 536. Justice Braucher joined in the 
Chief Justice's' dissent. Justice Hennessey also dissented in part, with Justice Kaplan 
joining. Id. at 1246, 315 N.E.2d at 543. While agreeing with the majority that there was 
no showing of probable cause and that the burden of proving probable cause rested 
with the Commonwealth, Justice Hennessey argued that the majority should not re-
mand the case for a new trial and that judgments of not guilty should be entered. Rely-
ing on the fact that the defendant had borrowed the car only an hour before his arrest 
and may not have known that there were illegal drugs in it, he argued that the Com-
monwealth had failed to prove knowledge, a requisite element of the crime of unlawful 
possession of narcotics. Id. at 1248-49, 315 N.E.2d at 543-44. Since this issue is beyond 
the scope of this note, Justice Hennessey's opinion will not be discussed further. 
30 Id. at 1_234, 315 N.E.2d at 536. 
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I 
this conclusion by referring to the language in Whiteley 31 which indi-
cated that although the officers were entitled to depend on the relia-
bility of the radio bulletin, where "the contrary [unreliability of the 
bulletin] turns out to be true, an otherwise illegal arrest cannot be in-
sulated from challenge by the decision of the instigating officer to rely 
on fellow officers to make the arrest."32 His disse~ contended that 
the Court's use of the language "the contrary" indi ated that the de-
fendant must prove the unreliability of the infor ation which re-
sulted in the police bulletin. The Chief Justice felt hat although An-
tobenedetto had satisfied his initial burden by est4blishing a prima 
facie case for suppression of the evidence by provin'g at trial that the 
search had been conducted without a warrant, the prosecution had 
rebutted its presumptive force by showing that the arresting officers 
had conducted the search on the basis of information contained in a 
radio bulletin received in the normal course of performing their 
duties. 33 Since Antobenedetto did not offer any evidence to demon-
strate the bulletin's unreliability, unlike the defendant in Whiteley, 
Chief Justice Tauro reasoned that the trial judge was entitled to infer 
that proper police action had led to the broadcast of !the bulletin. 34 
In examining the relevance of Whiteley to Antobene~etto, it should be 
noted that although Whiteley involved probable caus~ for an arrest, the 
Supreme Court has indicated that the same principles are applicable 
to probable cause for searches. 35 The Court in Whiteley also dealt with 
the issue of probable cause for a warrantless arrest or search,36 similar 
to the search conducted by the Framingham police in Antobenedetto. 
Although Whiteley's reasoning as to the quantum of evidence neces-
sary to establish probable cause is applicable to a warrantless search 
such as that in Antobenedetto, it is submitted that Whi~eley does not deal 
with the question of who has the burden of provin~ probable cause. 
The defendant in Whiteley was arrested pursuant t? a warrant. The 
well-recognized rule in the federal system is that where a search or 
arrest is conducted with a warrant, the party movinig to suppress the 
evidence has the burden of proving that a search or! arrest is illegal. 37 
In order to attack the warrant, Whiteley had to show that the infor-
31 Id. at 1233, 315 N.E.2d at 536-37 (dissenting opinion), citing 401 U.S. at 568. 
32 401 U.S. at 568. 
33 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1242,315 N.E.2d at 540-41 (dissenting opinion). 
34 Id. at 1243, 315 N.E.2d at 541 (dissenting opinion). The Chief Justice objected to 
the majority's characterization of the decision as a "departure" f~m prior law, rather 
than as an outright reversal. ld. at 1239, 301 N.E.2d at 539. The ajority claimed to be 
merely excepting warrantless searches from the "general rule" tha on a motion to sup-
press the burden of proving the illegality of a search is on the mo ant, noting that such 
searches are presumed unreasonable, in contrast to searches con ucted pursuant to a 
warrant. Id. at 1230-31, 315 N.E.2d at 534. See text at notes 41-51 infra. 
35 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 164 (1925). 1 
36 401 U.S. at 565-66. 
37 See C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 675, at 126-27 (1969). 
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mation relied upon by the magistrate in issuing the warrant did not 
constitute probable cause. Once lack of probable cause for the is-
suance of the warrant had been established by the defendant, the 
prosecution's argument that there was probable cause for a warrant-
less arrest, regardless of the sufficiency of the information to support 
a warrant, was futile. The prosecution had to rely on the information 
received in the bulletin by the arresting officers, the same information 
that the magistrate had improperly relied upon in issuing the warrant. 
Since the standards used in evaluating probable cause for a warrant-
less search or arrest are at least as stringent as those used by a review-
ing court in evaluating a magistrate's assessment of probable cause in 
issuing a warrant,38 there could not be probable cause for a warrant-
less search or arrest on the facts in Whiteley. The issue of which party 
has the burden of proving probable cause in a warrantless search or 
arrest was not before the Court in Whiteley, for by proving that the 
warrant was invalid, the defendant necessarily proved that the arrest-
ing officer did not have sufficient information to justify a warrantless 
search. In short, Whiteley dealt with the quantum of facts necessary to 
support a finding of probable cause, not with the question of alloca-
tion of the burden of proving those facts. 39 
Because the burden of proof was not at issue in Whiteley, the 
majority's decision in Antobenedetto can only be said to be compelled by 
Whiteley if it is presupposed that the burden of proving probable cause 
for a warrantless search is on the prosecution. If the Supreme Judicial 
Court first reached such a conclusion, the holding in Antobenedetto of 
lack of probable cause would appear to be correct. The Common-
wealth offered no background information in Antobenedetto as to the 
circumstances which resulted in the radio bulletin; 40 thus, the quan-
tum of facts which Whiteley held was necessary to support a finding of 
probable cause did not exist. It is thus submitted that Whiteley should 
control the decision in Antobenedetto only on the issue of probable 
cause, not on that of burden of proof. 
To support its conclusion that the burden of establishing the 
reasonableness of a warrantless search is on the Commonwealth, the 
majority in Antobenedetto cited numerous Supreme Court cases which 
indicate that searches conducted without a warrant are presumed in-
valid, and that the state must therefore demonstrate that the search 
falls within a permissible exceptionY For example, in Coolidge v. New 
38 401 U.S. at 566. 
39 For this reason, it is submitted that Whiteley is not authority for the position that a 
warrantless search should be considered legal and the evidence seized admissible unless 
the defendant proves the unreliability of the information which resulted in the radio 
bulletin. See text at notes 29-35 supra. 
40 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1230, 315 N.E.2d at 534. 
41 Id. at 1231, 315 N.E.2d at 534-35, citing Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); 
Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969); Recznik v. Lorain, 393 U.S. 166 (1968); 
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Hampshire 42 the Supreme Com'!: stated: 
§3.5 
The most basic constitutional rule in this area ~s that searches 
conducted outside the judicial process, without prlior approval by 
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment - subject only to a few specifically !established and 
well-delineated exceptions .... [T)here must bt1 a showing by 
those who seek the exemption ... that the exigencies of the situa-
tion made that course imperative. [T]he burden is on those seeking the 
exemption to show the need for it. 43 
1 
Whether the Supreme Court's language compels ~locating the bur-
den of proving probable cause for a warrantless search to the pros-
ecution depends on the interpretation given to the 1requirement that 
the prosecution "show the need" for the exemption from the warrant 
requirement. The majority in Antobenedetto equated the burden of 
showing the need for the exemption with the burden of proving 
probable cause. 44 This interpretation of the Supr(;!me Court's lan-
guage is supported by numerous lower federal cou~t decisions which 
hold that, while the defendant still has the burden of proving the lack 
of probable cause in a search conducted pursuant to a warrant,45 the 
government has that burden in a warrantless search.16 
These lower federal court decisions are not binding on the states, 
howeverY That the question is still unsettled is shown by the sugges-
tion that "[t]he Supreme Court has never been squarely confronted 
with the question of which party has the burden of proof on a motion 
to suppress for lack of probable cause."48 The Supreme Court has 
! 
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951). Chief Justice Tau~o was critical of cases 
which put the burden of proving probable cause on the prosecuti~n, claiming that they 
improperly rely either on judicial speculation as to what the Supreme Court might de-
cide if confronted with the question of which party has the burden of proof, or on in-
applicable language in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 1 ~74 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
1237-38, 315 N.E.2d at 538 (dissenting opinion). However, no aut~ority which explicitly 
relies on Miranda in placing the burden of proving probable cause for a warrantless 
search on the prosecution is cited by the dissent. In addition, the dissent inexplicably 
ignored the Supreme Court cases cited by the majority which deal with the per se un-
reasonableness of warrantless searches. 
42 403 u.s. 443 (1971). I 
43 Id. at 454-55 (emphasis added), citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 
(1967); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); United States v. Jeffers, 342 
U.S. 48, 51 (1951); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456!(1948). Accord, Vale 
v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); Recznik v. Lorain, 393 U.S. 166, 169-70 (1968). 
44 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1231, 315 N.E.2d at 535. ' 
45 See C. Wright, supra note 37, § 675, at 127. 
46 Id. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 330 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1964); Joseph v. Unit-
ed States, 239 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1957); Wilson v. United Statesj 218 F.2d 754 (lOth 
Cir. 1955). 1 
47 See Lafave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law ... Has Not ... Run 
Smooth", 1966 U. III. L.F. 255, 347 n.566. 
48 Symposium, 25 Ohio St. L.J. 501, 527 (1964). 
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only stated that the prosecution must "show the need" for an exemp-
tion from the warrant requirement49 and has not explicitly held that 
the prosecution has the burden of proving probable cause. As a re-
sult, many states continue to require that the defendant bear the ulti-
mate burden of proving lack of probable cause for a warrantless 
search.50 If the Supreme Court intended that the burden of showing 
the need for an exemption and the burden of proving probable cause 
should be synonymous, the choice of the words "show the need" was 
unfortunate. In contrast, in other areas involving the exclusionary 
rule, such as the voluntariness of a confession or the consent to a 
search, the Supreme Court has used explicit language to indicate that 
the prosecution has the burden of proof. 51 Thus, it is arguable that 
the holding in Antobenedetto that the burden of proving probable cause 
is on the prosecution is not compelled by decisions of the Supreme 
Court. 
Conceding that the Supreme Court has not specifically answered 
the question of which party has the burden of proving probable cause 
for a warrantless search, it is submitted that the underlying policies of 
the Fourth Amendment52 require that the prosecution bear the bur-
den. This would help in deterring illegal police activity, 53 one of the 
primary purposes of the exclusionary rule, a judicially-created rule 
designed to effectuate the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment.54 
49 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 454-55. See text at note 43 supra. 
50 See 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1236-37, 315 N.E.2d at 537-38 (dissenting opinion) and 
cases cited therein. 
51 E.g., Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972) (prosecution must prove at least 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary); Bumper v. 
North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968) (prosecution has the burden of proving that 
consent to a search was freely and voluntarily given). 
52 For a discussion of the history and purpose of the Fourth Amendment, see Weeks 
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,389-92 (1914). 
53 The Court has recognized that all too frequently law enforcement officers, perhaps 
believing that the end justifies the means, have "taken matters into their own hands" in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951). 
"Power is a heady thing; and history shows that police acting on their own cannot be 
trusted." McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,456 (1948). 
54 The exclusionary rule prevents the admission of evidence in a criminal prosecution 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The rule was first applied in Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), to bar illegally seized evidence from federal pros-
ecutions. Id. at 392. The Court recognized that if illegally seized evidence could be 
used, "the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring [a citizen's] right to be secure 
against unreasonable ... searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus 
placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution." Id. at 393. The 
exclusionary rule, in effect, prevented reducing the Fourth Amendment to a mere 
"form of words" in federal prosecutions. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 
U.S. 385, 392 (1920). In addition, in holding that the Fourteenth Amendment fully in-
corporates the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures and that the exclusionary rule is an essential element of that guarantee, the Su-
preme Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), emphasized that the exclusionary 
rule, by removing the incentive to disregard the Fourth Amendment, constituted the 
only effectively available way to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty. Id. at 
656. 
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I 
When police act without a warrant, the defendant k~ows little or noth-
ing about the circumstances preceding the searcr. Without a war-
rant specifying the basis for probable cause, the defendant has no 
readily available information upon which to attack the police action. 55 
Because of the difficulty a defendant has in attacking a warrantless 
search, successful objections may be raised so infrequently as to invite 
noncompliance with Fourth Amendment requirements by law en-
forcement agents, and render the exclusionary rule ineffective.56 
Placing the burden of proving probable cause for a warrantless 
search on the prosecution is consistent with the aim of deterring il-
legal police activity. The prosecution would be forc¢d to set forth the 
circumstances upon which the officer based his ! determination of 
probable cause, not an unrealistic burden for the pr~secution since, in 
a situation involving a warrantless search, "the evidence comprising 
probable cause is particularly within the knowledge and control of the 
arresting agencies."57 With this information, the defendant would 
have a more realistic opportunity to prove the illeg~lity of the search. 
The increased possibility of successful attack by thel defendant would 
eliminate the possible incentive for law enforcement agents to search 
and arrest persons on the basis of mere suspicion and not probable 
cause. 5 8 In brief, placing the burden of proving probable cause on the 
prosecution furthers the fundamental purpose }Vhich the Court 
sought in adopting the exclusionary rule - to imp~ess upon law en-
forcement agents that "(i]t is better ... that the g4ilty sometimes go 
free than that citizens be subject to easy arrest."59 ' 
The fact situation in Antobenedetto highlights the reasonableness of 
placing the burden of establishing probable cause on the prosecution 
in terms of the underlying policies of the Fourth A~endment and the 
dangers the Court sought to eliminate by creatin& the exclusionary 
rule. Antobenedetto was convicted of unlawful posstssion of narcotics 
55 "From a practical standpoint, it would be impossible for a defendant to prove a 
lack of probable cause in the abstract. The defendant cannot b4 expected to prove a 
lack of some item until he knows on what the government base!s its claim of its exis-
tence." Symposium, supra note 48, at 528. 1 
56 For a discussion of the ineffectiveness of the exclusionary tule, see McCormick's 
Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 166, at 367 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter 
cited as McCormick]. 
57 Rogers v. United States, 330 F.2d 535, 543 (5th Cir. 1964). Particular knowledge of 
the facts to be proved is one of the well-recognized factors in as$igning the burden of 
proof. See, e.g., McCormick, supra note 56,§ 337, at 787. : 
58 "Under our system suspicion is not enough for an officer t~ lay hands on a citi-
zen." Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959). 
59 Id. In certain cases, placing the burden of proving the illegality of a warrantless 
search on the accused can also operate to violate the basic Fourth Amendment proposi-
tion that "no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional evidence." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643, 657 (1 961). As argued by Chief Judge Fuld in his diss~nting opinion in Peo-
ple v. Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d 361, 270 N.E.2d 709 (1971), placing tllte burden of proving 
probable cause on the prosecution will allow the trial judge to I suppress evidence in 
those cases where he finds the evidence of the defendant and the prosecution equally 
credible and is unsure which side is telling the truth. Id. at 370-71, 270 N.E.2d at 714. 
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on the basis of a radio bulletin describing a vehicle being driven by 
suspected bad check passers. 60 Yet, the prosecution offered no evi-
dence of the circumstances which led to the broadcast. 61 The bulletin 
could have been the result of a desire by the police to harass the de-
fendant. There is nothing to prevent an officer from arresting some-
one who is a "known drug user and suspected bad check passer"62 by 
fabricating the receipt of a radio bulletin nor to prevent another of-
ficer from causing fellow officers to arrest a person by transmitting a 
false broadcast. Alternatively, a bulletin might result from an 
anonymous call to police headquarters. In order to obtain a search 
warrant on the basis of an anonymous tip, the police would have to 
produce evidence to support the reliability of the informant and the 
reliability of the informant's information which led to the conclusion 
that Antobenedetto and his companion were connected with the al-
leged passing of bad checks. 63 Yet, a radio bulletin might nevertheless 
be issued on the basis of an anonymous tip not meeting these stan-
dards. Because of the difficulty of proving a lack of probable cause 
when the burden is on the defendant, the result could be to insulate 
an unreliable, anonymous tip from successful challenge. This would 
allow law enforcement officers to use unreliable information which 
could not support the issuance of a warrant to obtain evidence on 
which a conviction might be based. In short, if the defendant has the 
burden of proof with its attendant evidentiary difficulties, it is more 
likely that an unreliable tip or police harassment could result in the 
arrest and conviction of the defendant. This situation could hardly be 
said to be consistent with the goal of deterring illegal police activity. 
In analyzing the purposes of the Fourth Amendment and the 
exclusionary rule in relation to the allocation of the burden of proof, 
important distinctions between searches conducted pursuant to a war-
rant and searches conducted without a warrant should be emphasized. 
The administrative necessity of discouraging non-meritorious chal-
lenges to warrants is an important reason advanced for requiring the 
party who is attacking the validity of the warrant to prove the inaccu-
racy of the information on which the warrant was issued. 64 In addi-
tion, the test of probable cause was specifically designed to balance the 
rights of the individual citizen with the countervailing reasonable 
necessities of law enforcement for the protection of the community.65 
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the magistrate's fun-
60 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1226, 315 N.E.2d at 531-32. 
61 Id. at 1230, 315 N.E.2d at 534. 
62 Id. at 1226, 315 N.E.2d at 532. 
63 See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 564-65 (1971). Accord, Aguilar v. Texas, 
378 U.S. 108 (1964), in which the Court held that to support a finding of probable 
cause, a police officer seeking a warrant based on an informer's tip must describe the 
underlying circumstances supporting the belief that the informant is credible and that 
there is a valid basis for the conclusions reached by the informant. Id. at 114. 
6 4 See McCormick, supra note 56, § 172, at 394, and cases cited therein. 
65 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). 
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damental role in preserving this balance.66 Where a warrant has been 
obtained, the party whose privacy has been invaded! has already had a 
prior judicial determination of probable cause; his .nterests in privacy 
have already been balanced against the evidence justifying the inva-
sion. In a warrantless search, however, a "neutral and detached" 
magistrate has not balanced the interest of the in4ividual to be free 
from unreasonable searches with the interest <l>f society in law 
enforcement. 67 It is the same law enforcement officer that the courts 
have recognized as prone to error68 who decides t<J> conduct a search 
without a warrant. Thus, the need to give finalit~ to a previously-
made judicial decision,69 which is a reason advanced for placing the 
burden of attacking a warrant on the defendant, does not apply in a 
warrantless search. If the state is to bypass the safeguards provided by 
the Fourth Amendment, it should at least be rehuired to provide 
after-the-fact justification in seeking a conviction based on evidence 
seized without a warrant. 
Placing the burden of proving the illegality of a jwarrantless search 
on the defendant is not only inconsistent with the policies of the 
Fourth Amendment as effectuated by the exclusionary rule, but is also 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court decisions if analogous Fifth 
Amendment cases. 70 In cases involving the admiss bility of a confes-
sion, the Supreme Court has held that the prosecuti n has the burden 
of proving that a confession was voluntary before it can be admitted. 71 
This determination by the Court should be applica~le in situations in-
volving warrantless searches since the Court has fOnsistently recog-
nized the "intimate relation" between the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments. 72 The general purpose of these two amendments is 
similar - to preserve inviolate the "principles of ~umanity and civil 
liberty, which had been secured in the mother qountry only after 
years of struggle." 73 Both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments seek to 
establish a proper balance between state and individual interests. 74 
66 See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 436 (1969). See also Henry v. United 
States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 700 (1948). 
67 Perhaps the classic statement of the reasons for the warr~nt requirement is set 
forth in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), in whiclt the Court contrasted 
the judgment of "a neutral and detached magistrate" with that of "an officer engaged 
in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." ld. at 14. 
68 See note 53 supra. 
69 See McCormick, supra note 56, § 172, at 394. ! 
70 See, e.g., Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972); Miranda v. 1Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
( 1966). In both cases the Court held that the prosecution has the burden of proving 
that a confession was voluntary. 
71 Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 474,489 (1966). 1 
72 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961); Bram v. United Stftes, 168 U.S. 532, 543 
(1897); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,633 (1886). 
73 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 544 (1897). "All these policies point to one 
overriding thought: the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege against self-
incrimination is the respect a government - state or federal - biust accord to the in-
te~rity of its citizens." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (I9fl6). 
4 Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) with Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). 
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Under the Fifth Amendment, the exclusionary rule operates to elimi-
nate the use of "physical brutality and violence" in obtaining 
confessions. 75 Under the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule 
operates to insure that searches and seizures are supported by proba-
ble cause, not mere suspicion. 76 The Court has recognized in the area 
of voluntary confessions that putting the burden of proof on the 
prosecution is consistent with the purpose of the exclusionary rule in 
that it serves to deter illegal police activity. 77 Logically, it should follow 
that the burden of proving probable cause for a warrantless search 
should be ~m the prosecution. 
The Court has also recognized that the state's control of the circum-
stances of the interrogation and of the sole means of producing evi-
dence that proper warnings were given makes it necessary that the 
prosecution bear the burden of proving that a confession was 
voluntary. 78 Similarly, only the prosecution has knowledge of the cir-
cumstances of a warrantless search. 79 In fact, the knowledge that the 
prosecution has in a warrantless search is even greater than in the 
case of a confession, since the defendant who confesses is at least 
present at the interrogation, whereas the defendant arrested pursuant 
to a warrantless search might know nothing of the circumstances pre-
ceding the search. 
In conclusion, the policy reasons which led the Court to place the 
burden of proving the voluntariness of a confession on the prosecu-
tion apply with equal, if not greater, force to warrantless searches and 
compel a similar allocation of the burden to the state. It is thus sub-
mitted that, in view of the fact that the Supreme Court has not ex-
plicitly stated which party has the burden of proof in a warrantless 
search, the Supreme Judicial Court in Antobenedetto correctly inter-
preted the implicit mandate of the Fourth Amendment. Nonetheless, 
the question of what impact the Antobenedetto decision will have on fu-
ture warrantless searches in Massachusetts remains unanswered. 80 
PAULD. MOORE 
75 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 446 (1966). The Court realized that "[u]nless a 
proper limitation upon custodial interrogation is achieved - such as these decisions will 
advance - there can be no assurance that practices of this nature will be eradicated 
.... " Id. at 447. 
76 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959). 
77 See note 75 supra. 
78 "Since the State is responsible for establishing the isolated circumstances under 
which the interrogation takes place and has the only means of making available cor-
roborated evidence of warnings given during an incommunicado interrogation, the 
burden is rightly on its shoulders." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). 
79 See text at note 57 supra. 
80 In Commonwealth v. Riggins, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1259, 315 N.E.2d 525, decided 
the same day as Antobenedetto, the Court considered the quantum of evidence necessary 
to establish probable cause in a warrantless search instigated by a police radio broadcast. 
The Court did not discuss burden of proof in its fmding that probable cause was pres-
ent, noting that "[u]nlike the situation in the Antobenedetto case, we have findings in the 
record which disclose the existence of a reliable source for the information which was 
broadcast over the police radio." Id. at 1265 n.5, 315 N.E.2d at 529 n.5. 
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